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Abstract:	Well-being,	health	and	freedom	are	some	of	the	many	phenomena	of	interest	to	science	whose	definition	relies	on	a	normative	standard.	Empirical	generalizations	about	them	thus	present	a	special	case	of	value-ladenness.		I	propose	the	notion	of	a	‘mixed	claim’	to	denote	such	generalizations.	Against	the	prevailing	wisdom,	I	argue	that	we	should	not	seek	to	eliminate	them	from	science.	Rather,	we	need	to	develop	principles	for	their	legitimate	use.	Philosophers	of	science	have	already	reconciled	values	with	objectivity	in	several	ways,	but	none	of	the	existing	proposals	are	suitable	for	mixed	claims.	Using	the	example	of	the	science	of	well-being,	I	articulate	a	conception	of	objectivity	for	this	science	and	for	mixed	claims	in	general.		
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Introduction	
	Consider	a	claim	‘C	causes	E	under	conditions	N’	that	is	well	confirmed	by	the	lights	of	the	scientific	discipline	in	which	this	claim	figures.	What	if	the	definition	of	C,	E,	or	N	presupposed	a	moral	standard	that	in	turn	determined	how	C,	E,	or	N	are	conceptualized	and	measured?	Would	you	trust	this	claim?	Would	you	grant	it	objectivity?	Would	you	let	it	be	part	of	science	at	all?		Empirical	claims	about	health,	well-being,	child	development,	freedom,	economic	growth,	resilience,	frailty	and	so	on,	appear	to	have	such	a	structure.	They	relate	ordinary	purely	empirical	variables,	such	as	geographic	location,	with	a	variable	that	is	defined	in	partly	normative	terms,	such	as	health	status,	as	in	‘Living	in	East	Saint	Louis	harms	health’.	Or	they	may	relate	two	variables	that	both	appear	to	have	a	normative	component	as	in	‘Unemployment	negatively	impacts	well-being’.	‘Health’	and	‘unemployment’	as	concepts	are	partly	normative	in	the	sense	that	their	definition	and	measurement,	at	least	on	the	face	of	it,	depend	on	normative	judgments	about	what	it	takes	to	be	healthy	and	what	it	takes	to	be	involuntarily	out	of	work.	I	propose	to	call	causal	or	correlational	claims	with	such	normative	presuppositions	‘mixed	claims’	because	they	mix	the	normative	and	the	empirical	in	a	way	that	ordinary	scientific	claims	do	not.	Mixed	claims	typically	occur	in	social	and	medical	sciences	such	as	economics,	and	clinical	and	developmental	psychology,	but	they	can	also	be	found	in	the	biological	and	environmental	sciences	too.			The	problem	is	that	the	typical	conception	of	scientific	objectivity	has	not	caught	up	with	this	reality.	Although	philosophers	have	noted	instances	of	mixedness,	there	is	no	clarity	on	what	to	do	about	them.	Objectivity	of	science	understood	as	value-freedom	has	been	a	dominant	conception	in	twentieth	century	philosophy	of	science	and	would	seem	to	counsel	against	mixed	claims.	But	this	conception	is	slowly	losing	its	grip	as	values	acquire	a	legitimate	place	in	science.	Yet	even	as	the	layers	of	value-freedom	are	being	peeled	off,	there	is	still	no	positive	story	about	how	projects	that	rely	on	mixed	claims	can	be	both	value-laden	and	objective.		In	this	paper	I	argue	in	favor	of	the	following:	1) Mixed	claims	are	distinct	from	other	well-rehearsed	ways	in	which	science	can	be	value-laden.	(Sections	2	and	3)	2) Some	claims	in	the	social	and	medical	sciences	should	remain	mixed,	against	the	advice	to	reformulate	them	into	value-free	claims	or	to	move	them	outside	science.	(Section	4)	3) The	existing	accounts	of	objectivity	that	make	room	for	values	do	not	fit	mixed	claims.	(Sections	5	and	6)	4) Nevertheless	mixed	claims	can	be	objective	in	a	sense	that	I	articulate	and	defend.	(Sections	7	and	8)		I	couch	these	theses	as	concerning	mixed	claims	in	general,	but	my	examples	will	be	mostly	drawn	from	the	science	of	well-being.	It	is	worth	concentrating	on	well-being	for	two	reasons.	First,	it	is	arguably	the	most	prominent	of	the	recent	mixed	projects	in	science.	It	is	studied	all	across	social,	psychological	and	
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medical	sciences,	has	a	number	of	newly	dedicated	journals	and	professional	societies,	and	regularly	tops	the	lists	of	the	most	popular	key	words	in	abstracts	of	published	papers.1	The	second	and	best	reason	to	focus	on	well-being	is	that	other	normative	concepts	regularly	bottom	out	in	well-being.	Measures	of	health,	growth,	development	etc.	are	justified	in	part	on	the	basis	of	their	ability	to	capture	well-being.2	So	an	account	of	how	the	science	of	well-being	can	be	objective	will	take	us	a	long	way	towards	understanding	mixed	claims	in	general.		
	
2.	What	are	mixed	claims?			‘Happiness	is	not	always	conducive	to	well-being’	(Grueber	et	al	[2011])		‘Long	commutes	are	associated	with	lower	well-being’	(Diener	et	al	[2008])		‘Early	learning	difficulties	have	a	disproportionate	impact	on	life	well-being’	(Beddington	et	al	[2008])		Social	scientists	who	make	such	claims	rely	on	a	conception	of	well-being.	In	psychology	this	conception	is	one	of	the	following	three.	The	first	one,	a	revival	of	hedonism,	treats	well-being	as	happiness	or	a	favorable	balance	of	positive	over	negative	emotions	(Kahneman	et	al	[2004b]).	This	can	be	measured	by	various	experience	sampling	methods.	The	second	tradition	takes	well-being	to	consist	in	life	satisfaction,	an	individual	judgment	about	how	one’s	life	is	doing	overall	(Diener	et	al	[2008]).		The	main	measurement	tool	here	is	a	self	reported	judgment	of	life	satisfaction.	Finally,	a	third	approach	speaks	of	well-being	as	flourishing	or	good	functioning,	an	ensemble	of	strengths	such	as	competence,	relatedness,	sense	of	achievement	and	meaning,	measured	by	self-reports	about	these	aspects	of	life	(Ryan	and	Deci	[2001]).	Settling	on	one	of	these	approaches	appears	to	be	a	choice	about	the	most	plausible	conception	of	well-being.	This	normative	step	is	important	because	one	of	the	goals	of	the	psychology	of	well-being	is	to	understand	whether	and	which	positive	emotions	are	good	for	us:	how	they	enable	better	functioning	of	individuals	and	communities,	but	also	whether	they	sometimes	harm	us.3			So	I	propose	a	definition:		 A	hypothesis	is	mixed	if	and	only	if:	1. It	is	an	empirical	hypothesis	about	a	putative	causal	or	statistical	relation.																																																									1	See	Zacks	and	Malley	[2007],	as	well	as	Journal	of	Happiness	Studies,	International	Journal	of	
Wellbeing,	and	the	International	Society	for	Quality	of	Life	Studies.	2	The	World	Health	Organization’s	1946	definition	of	health	is	‘a	state	of	complete	physical,	mental	and	social	wellbeing	and	not	merely	the	absence	of	disease	or	infirmity’(World	Health	Organization	[1948]).	3	For	example	Fredrickson	[2001]	and	Grueber	et	al	[2011].	
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2. At	least	one	of	the	variables	in	this	hypothesis	is	defined	in	a	way	that	presupposes	a	moral,	prudential,	political	or	aesthetic	value	judgment	about	the	nature	of	this	variable.		The	first	part	of	this	definition	specifies	mixed	hypotheses	as	the	causal	or	correlational	claims4	typical	in	social	and	medical	science.	(They	are	normally	probabilistic	hypotheses	relating	two	or	more	kinds).	Such	claims	play	a	crucial	role	in	explanations	and	policy	interventions.	But	I	phrase	my	definition	in	terms	of	causal	claims	only	for	simplicity.	They	do	not	exhaust	the	science	of	well-being	(or	any	other	science	for	that	matter).	Causal	claims	are	not	necessarily	more	fundamental	or	more	important	than	theoretical	claims,	non-propositional	knowledge,	images,	instruments	etc.	So	we	can	equally	well	have	mixed	theories,	mixed	measures	and	more	generally	mixed	sciences.	In	this	paper	I	consider	mixed	hypotheses	only	but	nothing,	I	believe,	rides	on	this	choice.		The	more	crucial	feature	of	mixed	claims	is	in	the	second	part	of	the	definition,	that	is	their	reliance	on	a	normative	judgment.	Such	a	reliance	occurs	in	two	ways.	First,	a	scientist	might	adopt	a	given	measure	because	she	believes	it	reflects	well-being	better	than	other	measures	–	an	explicit	normative	judgment.	Secondly,	a	scientist	might	follow	a	set	procedure	for	measurement	or	data	collection	–	for	example,	she	might	collect	data	on	reported	satisfaction	with	life	–	but	this	procedure	is	part	of	a	broad	methodological	decision	adopted	by	the	founders	of	the	research	program	of	which	the	scientist	is	a	member.	In	this	case,	adoption	of	a	measure	betrays	an	implicit	normative	commitment	to	the	validity	of	this	research	program.	Either	way	the	outcomes	of	the	process	are	mixed	claims,	whether	explicitly	or	implicitly.		What	sort	of	values	make	for	mixed	claims?	Philosophers	distinguish	between	cognitive	values	–	simplicity,	explanatory	power,	coherence,	generality	etc.	–	on	the	one	hand,	and	non-cognitive	values	–	moral,	prudential,	political	or	aesthetic	–	on	the	other	(Longino	[1990],	Lacey	[2005]).	It	is	the	second	kind	that	figures	in	mixed	claims.	For	science	of	well-being	(and	also	plausibly	health	and	child	development	sciences)	the	most	relevant	values	are	prudential.	In	other	cases,	such	as	claims	about	involuntary	employment,	dignity	at	work,	or	political	legitimacy,	the	values	presupposed	are	ethical	and	political.		Without	identifying	them	as	mixed	claims,	philosophers	have	noted	normative	content	in	the	scientific	study	of	efficiency	(Nagel	[1961],	Hausman	and	McPherson	2006]),	rape	(Dupre	[2007]),	spousal	abuse	(Root	[2007]),	unemployment	(Hausman	and	McPherson	[2006]),	divorce	(Anderson	[2004]),	inflation	(Reiss	[2010]),	aggression	(Longino	[2013]),	AHDH	(Hawthorne	[2013])	and,	of	course,	well-being	(Tiberius	[2004]).	My	notion	of	a	mixed	claim	captures	these	examples.	The	task	is	to	settle	whether	mixed	claims	should	be	part	of	science	and	if	so	what	rules	they	should	obey.			This	focus	should	be	distinguished	from	the	broader	project	of	understanding	the	nature	and	significance	of	‘thick	concepts’.	Ever	since	Bernard	Williams																																																									4	Here	I	use	‘claim’	and	‘hypothesis’	interchangeably.		
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coined	this	expression	philosophers	have	referred	to	‘well-being’,	‘courage’,	‘kindness’,	‘care’	etc	as	thick,	differentiating	them	from	‘good’	and	‘right’	which	are	supposedly	‘thin’.	Although	the	precise	definition	of	thickness	is	elusive,	it	is	meant	to	signal	a	certain	union	between	descriptive	and	evaluative	content	in	a	concept	(Kirchin	[2013]).	For	example,	‘well-being’	is	thick	to	the	extent	that	it	is	a	good	thing	to	have,	but	also	to	fare	well	is	to	have	a	certain	amount	of	health,	not	to	be	depressed,	lonely	etc.5		Thick	concepts	generate	a	number	of	controversies	especially	in	metaethics	and	philosophy	of	language.	They	have	been	thought	to	undermine	the	possibility	of	a	moral	theory	(Williams	[1985]),	to	expose	the	limits	of	the	fact/value	distinction	(Putnam	[2002]),	and	to	create	problems	for	cognitivism	(Blackburn	[2013]).	Others	disagree	that	thick	concepts	need	to	be	that	significant;	indeed	they	might	well	be	compatible	with	a	number	of	metaethical	views	(Roberts	[2013]).			My	intention	is	to	discuss	mixed	claims	in	science	while	inheriting	as	few	of	these	foundational	controversies	as	possible.	Some	philosophers	take	moral	claims	to	express	facts,	others	don’t.	Either	remains	an	option	for	mixed	claims.	Those	who	take	mixed	claims	literally	will	presumably	treat	thick	concepts	as	referring	to	real	entities	with	causal	powers:	for	example,	poverty,	a	phenomenon	picked	out	by	a	thick	concept,	really	does,	on	this	view,	have	the	power	to	cause	heart	disease.	Those	with	more	cautious	metaethical	views	are	free	to	adopt	an	anti-realist	reading	of	mixed	claims	instead:	perhaps	it	is	just	a	convenient	manner	of	speaking	to	say	that	poverty	causes	heart	disease.		Either	group	should	be	interested	in	what	I	have	to	offer	–	ground	rules	for	evaluating	mixed	claims	in	a	scientific	context.			
3.	Mixed	claims	are	different	To	formulate	such	rules	I	start	by	differentiating	the	value-ladenness	of	mixed	claims	from	other	kinds	of	value-ladenness.	A	taxonomy	of	the	ways	in	which	non-cognitive	values	can	enter	science	is	interesting	in	itself,	but	its	more	immediate	purpose	is	to	show	the	uniqueness	of	mixed	claims.6		
3.1.	Values	as	reasons	to	pursue	science	To	value	knowledge,	both	theoretical	and	applied,	is	to	value	understanding	and	perhaps	also	the	possibility	of	control	over	the	environment.	Without	this																																																									5 My mixedness	is	a	property	of	claims	rather	than	concepts,	but	if	we	were	to	extend	the	property	of	thickness	to	propositions	and	not	just	concepts,	then	mixed	claims	would	plausibly	come	out	as	thick.	‘Someone	who	is	well	does	not	cry	herself	to	sleep’	would	be	an	example	of	a	thick	proposition.	I	will	reserve	the	term	‘mixed’	for	hypotheses	and	‘thick’	for	concepts.'	Thick	description’	has	a	distinct	meaning	in	philosophy	of	social	science	denoting	ethnographic	accounts	that	locate	an	event	or	a	practice	within	a	culture	(Geertz	[1973]).	Since	not	all	thick	claims	will	amount	to	a	thick	description	in	the	sense	used	in	anthropology	it	is	wise	to	keep	the	term	‘mixed	claims’.	6	This	taxonomy	is	a	product	of	conversations	with	Stephen	John.	
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normative	stance	the	pursuit	of	science	as	a	social	enterprise	makes	little	sense.	But	this	sense	of	value-ladenness	clearly	does	not	imply	that	individual	scientific	claims	presuppose	a	specific	standard	about,	in	our	case,	well-being.	It	is	entirely	conceivable	to	value	knowledge	without	pursuing	mixed	claims.		
3.2.	Values	as	agenda-setters	Normative	commitments	about	what	phenomena	are	interesting,	important	and	worth	studying	partially	set	research	agendas.	For	social	sciences,	Max	Weber	famously	emphasized	the	role	of	cultural,	moral	and	other	commitments	for	selection	of	one	ideal	type	over	another	(Weber	[1949]).	Nowadays	a	similar	argument	is	made	by	several	others	and	not	just	about	the	social	sciences.	Hugh	Lacey	([1999],	[2005])	identifies	‘autonomy’	as	one	of	the	senses	of	value	freedom	and	defines	it	as	the	absence	of	external	influence	of	moral,	cultural	and	economic	nature	on	the	priorities	and	direction	of	basic	research.	He	maintains	that	such	autonomy	is	an	impossible	ideal,	just	because	any	scientific	inquiry	must	start	with	a	strategy	that	specifies	what	there	is	in	the	world	to	be	known	and	how	to	proceed.	Any	such	strategy	is	formulated	from	a	cultural	and	historical	standpoint	and	will	prioritize	some	phenomena	and	methods	over	others	by	appeal	to	moral	or	cognitive	values.	A	failure	of	autonomy,	Lacey	claims,	need	not	necessarily	compromise	the	authority	of	science.	Philip	Kitcher’s	ideal	of	a	well-ordered	science	also	calls	for	moral	and	political	values	endorsed	by	a	representative	community,	to	determine	the	agenda	of	scientific	research	(Kitcher	[2011]).			Exactly	how	values	should	determine	the	agenda	of	science	remains	up	for	grabs.	For	our	purposes,	we	only	need	to	distinguish	this	agenda-setting	function	of	values	from	their	role	in	mixed	claims.	There	can	be	moral	and	political	reasons	to	initiate	a	scientific	study	of	human	and	animal	well-being,	but	these	reasons	alone	do	not	force	us	to	go	mixed.	We	could	instead	insist	on	new	value-free	definitions	of	well-being	as	we	shall	see	in	Section	4.		
3.3.	Values	as	ethical	constraints	on	research	protocols	A	third	and	probably	the	least	controversial	role	for	values	is	the	specification	of	ethical	constraints	on	scientific	research.	These	constraints	direct	how	to	treat	human	and	animal	subjects	during	experiments,	surveys	and	clinical	trials.	Again	nothing	here	speaks	for	or	against	the	use	of	normative	categories	to	define	the	target	phenomena	as	in	the	case	of	well-being	research.		A	scientific	protocol	can	be	ethical	or	unethical	irrespective	of	whether	the	claims	it	produces	presuppose	non-cognitive	values.		
3.4.	Values	as	arbiters	between	underdetermined	theories	When	empirical	evidence	alone	is	insufficient	to	adjudicate	between	two	or	more	theories,	values	have	been	noticed,	indeed	called,	to	close	the	gap.	Feminist	philosophers	in	particular	have	invoked	this	argument	to	point	out	the	legitimate	role	in	theory	choice	of	moral	and	political	values	(Longino	[1990],	Kourany	[2003]	and	many	others).			
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Our	case	is	different.	Take	a	mixed	claim	that	long	commutes	are	on	average	bad	for	well-being.	This	claim	could,	of	course,	be	underdetermined	by	evidence.	Is	it	really	the	commute?	Maybe	commuters	are	grim	characters	to	start	with?	Confirming	the	badness	of	commuting	for	well-being	requires	a	variety	of	intricate	evidence:	negative	emotions,	stress	hormone	levels,	irritability,	self-reports	and	behavior.	Values,	even	non-cognitive	ones,	could	undoubtedly	enter	to	adjudicate	between	equally	confirmed	mixed	hypotheses.	But	crucially	for	us,	this	process	is	distinct	from	the	mixed	case:	in	mixed	claims,	say	about	well-being,	the	standard	of	well-being	itself	is	not	what	closes	the	gap.			
3.5.	Values	as	determinants	of	standards	of	confirmation	Another	role	for	values	explored	originally	in	the	1950s	by	Richard	Rudner	and	revived	recently	by	Heather	Douglas	is	in	setting	the	level	of	evidence	required	for	the	acceptance	of	empirical	hypotheses	(Douglas	[2009]).	When	there	is	uncertainty	about	a	hypothesis	that	can	inform	important	policy	decisions	(for	instance,	that	drug	X	has	certain	side	effects),	moral	considerations	can	be	used	to	settle	the	level	of	evidence	required	for	this	hypothesis.	Depending	on	the	gravity	of	the	consequences,	a	different	level	of	evidence	can	be	required.	When	the	suspected	side	effect	of	the	drug	in	question	is	as	serious	as	a	heart	attack,	a	relatively	small	amount	of	evidence	can	be	sufficient	to	accept	the	hypothesis	‘Drug	X	causes	heart	attacks’.			There	is	still	a	debate	about	whether	or	not	such	an	importation	of	values	into	science	is	legitimate	(John	[2015]).	But	regardless	of	the	outcome,	the	fate	of	mixed	claims	remains	unaffected.	Mixed	claims	can	take	inductive	risks	just	as	much	as	non-mixed	claims.	They	would	still	remain	value-laden	even	if	moral	considerations	were	purged	from	decisions	about	the	level	of	evidence	required.		
3.6.	Values	as	sources	of	wishful	thinking	and	fraud	The	history	of	science	is	in	many	ways	a	story	of	non-cognitive	values,	along	with	fear,	desire	for	glory	and	power,	entering	into	production	of	knowledge.	In	our	mixed	cases,	as	we	shall	see	in	section	5.1,	these	values	too	can	determine	what	claims	are	accepted.	But	there	is	a	prima	facie	distinction	between	clear	wrongs	such	as	fudging	data,	falsifying	results,	or	rejecting	a	theory	because	it’s	Jewish,	on	the	one	hand,	and	basing	science	on	thick	concepts	as	in	our	case.	It	may	still	turn	out	that	mixed	claims	are	illegitimate,	but	that	should	be	for	a	different	reason	than	the	illegitimacy	of	wishful	thinking	and	fraud.			This	completes	our	taxonomy	for	present	purposes.	There	are	plausibly	other	roles	for	values	in	science,	but	the	bottom	line	is	that	mixed	claims	are	in	a	class	of	their	own	–	they	need	to	be	discussed	separately.	Hugh	Lacey’s	notion	of	‘neutrality’	captures	our	case.	According	to	neutrality,	scientific	claims	neither	presuppose	nor	support	non-cognitive	value	judgments	(Lacey	[2005],	pp.	25-26).7	Mixed	claims	clearly	violate	neutrality.	In	the	science	of	well-being	in																																																									7	Lacey	eventually	redefines	neutrality	as	inclusiveness	and	evenhandedness	(Lacey	[2013]),	an	ideal	which	mixed	claims	can	satisfy	as	we	shall	see	in	sections	6	and	7.	
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particular,	mixed	hypotheses	presuppose	a	given	standard	of	well-being,	and	in	doing	so	can	favor	some	conception	of	prudential	value	over	another.		Now	we	can	ask	the	big	question:	Are	mixed	claims	legitimate	in	science?			
4.	Mixed	claims	should	stay	
	The	most	explicit	case	against	mixed	claims	can	be	found	in	Ernst	Nagel’s	classic	
The	Structure	of	Science,	in	a	section	entitled	‘On	the	Value-Oriented	Bias	of	Social	Inquiry’.	In	it	Nagel	discusses	the	possibility	that	social	science	cannot,	even	in	principle,	be	value	free.	He	cites	Leo	Strauss’s	examples	of	quintessential	thick	concepts	–	art,	religion,	cruelty	–	agreeing	that	the	evaluative	content	is	there	and	that	it	may	be	practically	difficult	to	extricate	it	from	the	positive	content.	However,	it	is	still	possible	if	we	distinguish	between	two	senses	of	value	judgment	at	play:	one	‘appraising’	and	the	other	‘estimating’	(Nagel	[1961],	pp.	492-493).	We	appraise	when	we	endorse	an	ideal	and	judge	something	as	meeting	it	or	failing	to	meet	it.	We	estimate	when	we	judge	to	what	extent	a	given	phenomenon	exhibits	the	features	characteristic	of	a	given	ideal.		Nagel’s	example	is	of	anemia,	but	I	shall	apply	his	distinction	to	well-being.	Social	scientists	appraise	when	they	take	a	stance	on	what	well-being	is	and	then	use	it	to	judge	whether	a	person	or	a	community	is	doing	well.	On	the	other	hand,	they	estimate,	when,	using	an	account	of	well-being,	they	judge	how	much	a	person	or	a	community	exhibit	the	features	this	account	deems	as	well-being	constitutive.	In	the	first	case,	there	is	a	genuine	value	judgment,	while	in	the	second	a	mere	use	of	a	normative	criterion	to	make	an	empirical	claim.		Nagel’s	goal	in	that	chapter	is	a	narrow	one	–	only	to	establish	that	there	is	nothing	inherently	different	about	social	sciences	in	the	way	they	use	values.	For	that,	Nagel	points	out	that	physicists	and	biologists	would	also	face	the	same	issues	when	working	with	notions	of	‘efficiency’	and	‘anemia’.	I	readily	agree.		But	his	prising	apart	of	appraisal	from	estimation	has	more	ambitious	intentions.	The	point	of	drawing	the	distinction	is	to	eliminate	appraisal	from	science,	leaving	only	estimation.	The	ideal	science	for	him	is	an	ethically	neutral	one	(Nagel	[1961],	p.495).	What	I	have	called	mixed	claims	are	plausibly	appraising	claims	on	Nagel’s	picture.	So	his	proposal,	which	has	a	long	history8,	would	be	to	reformulate	them	as	estimation	claims	and	eliminate	the	appraisal	element.	How?		A	natural	way	to	implement	Nagel’s	proposal	is	to	convert	mixed	claims	from	regular	causal	or	correlational	claims	into	conditional	claims.	Take	one	of	our																																																									8	John	Stuart	Mill	endorses	this	ideal	in	his	System	of	Logic:	“A	scientific	observer	or	reasoner,	merely	as	such,	is	not	an	adviser	for	practice.	His	part	is	only	to	show	that	certain	consequences	follow	from	certain	causes,	and	that	to	obtain	certain	ends,	certain	means	are	the	most	effectual.	Whether	the	ends	themselves	are	such	as	ought	to	be	pursued,	and	if	so,	in	what	cases	and	to	how	great	a	length,	it	is	no	part	of	his	business	as	a	cultivator	of	science	to	decide,	and	science	alone	will	never	qualify	him	for	the	decision.''	(Mill	[1882],	n.pag.).			
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earlier	examples:	psychologist	Jane	Gruber’s	claim	that	happiness	is	not	always	conducive	to	well-being	(Gruber	et	al	[2011]).	Gruber	documents	the	negative	effects	of	positive	emotions	on	problem	solving,	social	bonds,	mental	health	etc.		The	title	of	her	article	–	‘A	Dark	Side	of	Happiness?	How,	When,	and	Why	Happiness	Is	Not	Always	Good’	–	reads	very	much	as	an	appraisal	claim.	But	we	can	reformulate	it	as	an	estimation	claim	as	follows:		‘If	well-being	is	understood	as	good	functioning	across	many	domains	and	over	the	course	of	a	life,	then	happiness	can	impede	well-being.’		Since	there	is	no	commitment	to	the	truth	of	the	antecedent,	this	claim	is	value	free	in	the	sense	of	Nagel’s	estimation	claims.	Nagel’s	position	can	then	be	summarized	as	follows:		For	any	mixed	claim	involving	a	cause	or	a	correlation	C,	a	thick	concept	T	and	an	operationalization	O	of	T	1) Scientists	can	investigate	estimation	claims:	‘If	T	is	operationalized	as	O,	then	C’.	2) Scientists	cannot	investigate	appraisal	claims	that	have	not	been	so	conditionalized.			
4.1.	Against	Nagel	Nagel’s	proposal	eliminates	values	at	one	stage,	but	it	only	pushes	them	to	another	less	appropriate	stage,	as	I	shall	argue	now.		Suppose	we	went	with	Nagel	and	reformulated	mixed	claims	into	estimation	claims,	there	would	still	remain	a	question	as	to	which	normative	standard	scientists	should	use	in	their	estimation	claims.	What	operationalization	should	Gruber	use	in	the	antecedent?	I	can	think	of	three	answers	a	Nagelian	could	give.		The	first	one	is	to	recommend	that	scientists	stick	to	the	proverbial	folk	theory	of	well-being.	More	generally	mixed	claims	could	be	rendered	value-free	if	they	defined	their	thick	concepts	using	the	value	judgments	of	the	community	they	studied.	‘Happiness	can	impede	that	which	our	community	calls	well-being’,	would	be	Gruber’s	claim.		Or	when	both	the	putative	cause	and	the	putative	effect	are	thick	we	get	the	following:	‘What	our	community	calls	secure	attachment	is	a	major	cause	of	what	our	community	calls	child	well-being’.		The	problem	with	this	proposal	is	that	the	folk	disagree	even	within	one	community	and	any	proposal	for	how	such	a	disagreement	can	be	resolved	is	itself	normative.		The	second	Nagelian	proposal	is	to	counsel	that	scientists	study	the	empirical	relations	between	well-being	and	a	given	factor	on	all	the	existing	views	of	well-being.	If	these	are	fairly	represented	by	hedonic,	life	satisfaction	and	flourishing	approaches	in	psychology,	then	the	science	of	well-being	should	build	up	a	store	of	conditional	claims:		
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‘If	well-being	is	positive	hedonic	profile,	then	it	is	caused	by…’	‘If	well-being	is	life	satisfaction,	then	it	is	caused	by…’	‘If	well-being	is	a	sense	of	flourishing,	then	it	is	caused	by…’		But	it	is	hard	to	see	why	we	should	stop	at	these	three.	History	of	philosophy	especially	if	we	look	beyond	the	Western	traditions,	boasts	of	other	theories	of	well-being:	well-being	as	knowledge	of	God,	well-being	as	a	meditative	state,	etc.	Using	them	all	is	impossible,	but	a	choice	requires	a	normative	judgment	about	their	relative	plausibility	–	a	judgment	that	the	Nagelian	hopes	to	keep	out	of	science.				The	third	and	most	likely	Nagelian	proposal	is	some	sort	of	division	of	labor:	scientists	take	care	of	facts,	while	others	take	care	of	values.	The	Nagelian	would	presumably	argue	that	the	right	standard	of	well-being	to	use	in	the	science	of	well-being	is	within	the	purview	of	moral	philosophers	(or	also	democratic	decision	makers).	Scientists	can	participate	in	this	discussion,	but	not	qua	scientists.			This	proposal	should	also	be	rejected.	In	mixed	cases	normative	decisions	do	not	occur	just	at	the	beginning	of	the	scientific	process	when	the	object	of	study	is	defined.	Rather	they	keep	reoccurring	throughout,	all	the	way	down	to	the	many	practical	decisions	of	scientific	protocol.	Those	who	define	well-being	in	terms	of	authentic	happiness,	need	an	account	of	authenticity	and	a	whole	string	of	other	value-driven	notions	about	how	to	measure	it	properly	(Sumner	[1996],	Tiberius	[2013]).	The	economists	adhering	to	the	preference	view	of	well-being	refer	to	the	notion	of	‘clean’	preferences	to	differentiate	authoritative	from	unauthoritative	desires	(Benjamin	et	al	[2014]).	Definitions	of	child	well-being	refer	to	healthy	and	unhealthy	parental	involvement.	When	divorce	is	viewed	as	a	transformation	rather	than	only	as	a	loss,	it	is	worth	studying	the	evolution	of	divorcees’	coping	strategies	long	after	the	divorce	and	not	just	their	shock	and	loneliness	immediately	after	(Anderson	[2004]).	And	so	on	and	so	forth.	On	the	separation	picture,	the	scientist	keeps	running	back	and	forth	to	the	philosopher	(or	keeps	changing	her	identify	from	scientist	to	philosopher)	whenever	an	evaluative	question	arises.			It	is	not	the	impracticality	of	this	proposal	that	offends.	After	all	ethicists	(or	other	specialists	on	thick	concepts)	could,	on	Nagel’s	proposal,	be	‘embedded’	in	a	scientific	process,	for	example	as	members	of	the	lab	who	step	in	to	make	a	normative	judgment.	Rather	the	problem	with	the	proposed	division	of	labor	is	that	it	ignores	or	devalues	scientists’	knowledge	about	values,	which	they	have	acquired	in	virtue	of	their	knowledge	of	facts.	This	knowledge	enables	them	to	make	better	normative	choices	qua	scientists.	It	is	because	developmental	psychologists	know	the	effect	of,	say,	institutionalization	of	orphans	that	they	believe	attachment	to	be	crucial	to	child	well-being.	Similarly,	it	is	because	divorce	scholars	know	the	consequences	of	divorce	that	they	conceptualize	it	as	an	opportunity	for	personal	growth	and	not	merely	a	loss	(Anderson	[2004]).	In	all	these	familiar	cases	value	judgments	are	a	result	of	an	epistemic	process,	they	are	informed	in	part	by	facts	and	in	part	by	the	earlier	value	judgments	made	to	detect	those	facts.	Because	of	this	process	of	co-evolution,	scientists	are	in	a	good	
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position	to	make	some	value	judgments.	Consulting	philosophers	and	the	public	when	making	normative	choices	is	important,	but	that	does	not	mean	scientists	should	refrain	from	using	their	own	hard	earned	normative	knowledge.9		So	the	Nagelian	division	of	labor	ignores	the	methodological	realities	of	mixed	sciences	and	wastes	the	normative	knowledge	scientists	acquire	while	in	the	business	of	producing	mixed	claims.	That	much	is	sufficient	for	a	prima	facie	case	that	mixed	claims	are	worth	preserving.				
5.	The	Dangers	of	Mixed	Claims		What	if	mixed	claims,	defensible	in	theory,	are	dangerous	in	practice?		They	might,	for	instance,	bring	with	them	dogmatism,	bias	and	wishful	thinking.	These	are	the	very	charges	that	have	been	levied	against	proposals	of	feminist	science	(Pinnick	et	al	[2003])	and	that	advocates	of	feminist	science	have	gone	to	lengths	to	deny	(Anderson	[2006]	among	others).			It	is	an	empirical	question	to	what	extent	mixed	claims,	as	compared	to	non-mixed	ones,	foster	scientific	malpractice.	There	is	no	data	on	whether	mixed	claims	are	treated	more	or	less	dogmatically,	or	whether	its	proponents	are	more	or	less	likely	to	engage	in	wishful	thinking.	Here	I	allow	for	this	possibility,	but	rather	than	speculating	I	concentrate	straightaway	on	two	well-documented	dangers	specific	to	well-being	science.			The	most	serious	charge	is	an	importation	into	a	science	of	substantive	views	about	the	nature	of	well-being	that	those	whose	well-being	is	being	studied	have	good	reasons	to	reject.	When	eminent	economists	including	Nobel	Prize	winners	advocate	a	measure	of	national	well-being	that	takes	into	account	only	the	average	ratio	of	positive	to	negative	emotions	of	the	populace	(Kahneman	et	al	[2004a]),	the	citizens	can	legitimately	object	if	they	take	well-being	to	consist	in	more	than	that.	Perhaps	they	believe	that	national	well-being	should	also	encompass	the	compassion,	kindness,	mutual	trust	of	their	community,	or	the	sustainability	of	their	lifestyle,	not	to	mention	justice.			A	related	danger	is	when	the	scientists	engaged	in	mixed	science	fail	to	notice	the	value	judgments	they	are	making.	Economists	have	been	known	for	treating	preference	satisfaction	as	revealed	by	willingness	to	pay	as	definitional	of	well-																																																								9	To	treat	values	as	responsive	to	facts	commits	no	metaethical	sins.	As	Anderson	points	out,	even	if	Hume’s	prohibition	of	inferring	facts	from	values	is	correct,	values	can	still	be	supported	by	facts:	‘Even	if	we	grant	that	no	substantive	value	judgment	logically	follows	from	any	conjunction	of	factual	statements,	this	merely	puts	value	judgments	on	a	logical	par	with	scientific	hypotheses.	For	it	is	equally	true	that	there	is	no	deductively	valid	inference	from	statements	of	evidence	alone	to	theoretical	statements.	Theories	always	logically	go	beyond	the	evidence	adduced	in	support	of	them.	The	question	of	neutrality	is	not	whether	factual	judgments	logically	entail	value	judgments,	but	whether	they	can	stand	in	evidentiary	relations	to	them’	(Anderson	[2004],p.5)		
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being	and	thus	not	needing	a	justification.	‘Cost-benefit	analysis	is	what	evaluation	means!’	said	a	UK	Treasury	economist	to	a	Whitehall	civil	servant	I	talked	to	recently.		In	those	cases	presenting	empirical	findings	about	well-being,	freedom	or	health	while	failing	to	make	explicit	the	normative	assumptions	on	which	these	findings	depend,	amounts	to	misusing	the	authority	of	science.	It	sneaks	controversial	values	in	through	inattention.		Let	us	call	these	dangers	‘imposition’	and	‘inattention’	respectively.		They	are	not	the	only	dangers,	but	I	submit	they	are	the	most	visible	and	distinctive	of	well-being	science.	They	undermine	trust	in	it	and	raise	the	danger	of	coercive	paternalism.10	But	instead	of	banning	mixed	claims	from	science,	I	propose	to	look	for	principles	for	their	use	that,	though	they	may	not	guard	against	every	danger,	would	at	the	very	least	guard	against	these	two	mistakes.			
6.	The	Existing	Accounts	of	Objectivity		A	natural	place	to	look	for	such	principles	is	in	the	accounts	of	scientific	objectivity	friendly	to	values.	As	we	shall	here	they	are	of	limited	help.		Perhaps	the	best	known	such	account	is	Helen	Longino’s,	summarized	by	herself	thus:	 	Data	(measurements,	observations,	experimental	results)	acquire	evidential	relevance	for	hypotheses	only	in	the	context	of	background	assumptions.	These	acquire	stability	and	legitimacy	through	surviving	criticism.	Justificatory	practices	must	therefore	include	not	only	the	testing	of	hypotheses	against	data,	but	the	subjection	of	background	assumptions	(and	reasoning	and	data)	to	criticism	from	a	variety	of	perspectives	(Longino	[2008],	p.80).		She	argues	that	this	sort	of	criticism	can	be	secured	by	a	community	characterized	by	the	following	features:	availability	of	venues	for	criticism,	uptake	of	criticism,	public	standards	to	which	theories	and	procedures	can	be	held,	and	an	equality	of	intellectual	authority	(Longino	[1990],pp.76-79,	among	other	places).	Like	Longino,	Hugh	Lacey	too	emphasizes	pluralism	of	research	strategies	as	a	way	of	counterbalancing	the	value-ladenness	of	background	assumptions	(Lacey	[2005]).	When	scientific	research	proceeds	from	multiple	ideological	and	metaphysical	stances	and	when	each	is	forced	to	justify	itself	in	a	public	forum,	the	outcome	is	an	objective	inquiry,	so	the	story	goes.	Douglas	[2004]	aptly	calls	this	‘interactive	objectivity’.	I	think	interactive	objectivity	is	not	enough.		
																																																								10	For	an	argument	to	this	effect	see	Haybron	and	Alexandrova	2013	where	we	define	the	notion	of	'inattentive	paternalism'.	
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Pluralism	and	open	criticism	need	a	more	robust	formulation	specific	to	the	case	of	mixed	claims.	Otherwise	these	criteria	are	too	vague	for	guarding	against	imposition	and	inattention.		Pluralism	about	definitions	of	well-being	already	characterizes	the	science	of	well-being.	No	single	definition	of	well-being	dominates	the	current	landscape.	Psychology	alone	boasts	three	as	we	have	seen;	health	sciences	use	quality	of	life	adapted	to	different	diseases;	developmental	psychology	has	a	conception	of	child	well-being;	mainstream	economics	is	wedded	to	preferences	as	revealed	by	choices;	development	economics	uses	an	objective	quality	of	life	approach,	and	so	on	and	so	forth	(Alexandrova	[2012]).		Such	a	variety	of	definitions	could	alert	researchers	to	the	problems	of	inattention	and	imposition.	But	by	itself	pluralism	does	not	ensure	that	moral	presuppositions	are	noticed	and	scrutinized	in	the	right	way.	Measures	of	well-being	are	often	selected	for	their	ease	of	use,	psychometric	properties,	institutional	and	disciplinary	inertia,	or	personal	preference.	There	is	no	guarantee	in	pluralism	alone	that	these	choices	are	noticed	and	called	out	for	imposition	and	inattention.	It	is	also	not	enough	to	say,	as	Longino	and	Lacey	do,	that	different	research	programs	need	to	be	open	to	effective	criticism.	Mixed	claims	need	a	very	specific	sort	of	criticism	on	normative	grounds,	not	just	any	criticism.		
6.1.	The	perils	of	impartiality	Another	common	criterion	of	objectivity	–	‘impartiality’	–	faces	a	different	problem:	on	one	formulation	it	excludes	mixed	claims	outright,	on	another	it	allows	for	mixed	claims	but	without	helping	with	inattention	and	imposition.11	Impartiality	specifies	that	cognitive	values	alone,	and	not	moral	and	political	ones,	should	justify	our	acceptance	and	rejection	of	theories	(Lacey	[2005],	pp.23-24).	To	violate	impartiality,	it	is	claimed,	is	to	commit	the	error	of	wishful	thinking.	Speaking	of	social	sciences	in	particular	Douglas	argues:			If	values	[…]	serve	as	the	reason	in	themselves	for	a	theory	choice,	we	have	confused	the	normative	and	the	descriptive	in	precisely	the	ways	that	Weber	and	Nagel	warned	us	against.	Our	values	are	not	a	good	indication,	in	themselves,	of	the	way	the	world	is	(Douglas	[2011],	pp.23-24).12		The	problem	is	that	when	impartiality	is	formulated	in	a	standard	way	as	forbidding	that	values	determine	our	acceptance	of	hypotheses,	mixed	claims	face	a	test	they	could	not	possibly	pass.	This	is	because	in	a	mixed	claim	the																																																									11	Impartiality	is	endorsed	by	Weber	[1949],	Douglas	[2009],	Lacey	[2005]	among	others.	12	To	be	precise,	Douglas’s	conception	of	impartiality	is	different	from	Lacey’s.	She	does	not	rely	on	the	distinction	between	cognitive	and	non-cognitive	values,	but	instead	on	the	distinction	between	direct	and	indirect	roles	of	value.	Once	values	have	been	invoked	‘directly’	in	our	choice	of	what	to	study	and	methodology,	no	further	direct	role	of	values	is	permitted.	When	it	comes	to	confirmation	of	hypotheses	values	are	only	to	be	used	‘indirectly’	for	managing	uncertainty	(Douglas	[2009],	chapter	5).	
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initial	value	judgment	does	preclude	certain	findings	and	to	this	extent	values	do	determine	what	we	will	find.			Consider	an	example:	a	staunch	Aristotelian	about	well-being	who	believes	that	only	the	virtuous	can	flourish,	includes	a	morality	constraint	in	her	measure	of	well-being	(ignore	for	a	moment	the	practical	difficulty	of	doing	so).	Using	this	measure	she	finds	that	well-being	is	very	low	in	a	community	of	sociopaths.	Clearly	this	finding	is	determined	in	part	by	her	initial	value	judgment	and	in	this	sense	it	fails	the	impartiality	test.		But	equally	psychologists	who	use	life	satisfaction	questionnaires	cannot	discover	a	well-faring	albeit	constantly	complaining	kvetch,	while	those	who	use	purely	hedonic	measures	cannot	discover	a	well-faring	tortured	artist	no	matter	how	eagerly	she	endorses	her	life.				Definitions	of	well-being	constrain	the	range	of	available	findings,	just	as	theories	constrain	the	range	of	available	observations.	When	a	prudential	value	judgment	is	part	of	the	background	theory,	impartiality	thus	defined	cannot	be	sustained.	It	makes	mixed	claims	come	out	illegitimate	by	definition.	They	cannot	escape	the	company	of	wishful	thinking	and	scientific	fraud.	This	is	unsatisfactory:	the	legitimacy	of	mixed	claims	should	not	be	a	matter	of	definition.	A	better	formulation	of	impartiality	is	as	follows:	
	Impartiality2:	A	mixed	claim	is	impartial	if	and	only	if,	once	all	the	value	decisions	about	the	measures,	methods	and	required	levels	of	confirmation	are	made,	non-cognitive	values	to	do	not	play	any	further	role	in	determining	whether	the	hypothesis	is	accepted.		To	be	fair,	this	is	probably	the	version	closest	to	what	advocates	of	impartiality	have	in	mind13,	and	it	may	well	be	acceptable	to	them.	All	I	claim	is	that	Impartiality2	does	not	help	us	with	imposition	and	inattention.	This	rule	guards	against	the	imposition	of	values	into	claims	already	stripped	of	any	values	but	epistemic.	It	cannot	therefore	tell	us	how	to	deal	with	claims	that	are	not	stripped	of	them,	for	example,	mixed	claims.		So	while	pluralism,	open	criticism	and	impartiality2	are	important,	perhaps	necessary,	mixed	science	needs	additional	principles.		
7.	Objectivity	for	Mixed	Claims		The	additional	principles	we	are	looking	for	are	partly	principles	of	objectivity	about	values	–	prudential,	ethical,	political,	whichever	feature	in	mixed	claims.																																																									13	Lacey	[2003]	makes	allowance	for	the	use	of	values	in	methodological	choices	in	the	human	sciences	and	Douglas	would	classify	the	choice	of	which	thick	concept	to	study	as	an	initial	methodological	decision	in	which	the	direct	use	of	values	is	permitted	[personal	conversation].	Anderson	[2004]	too	is	careful	in	formulating	impartiality:	“If	a	hypothesis	is	to	be	tested,	the	research	design	must	leave	open	a	fair	possibility	that	evidence	will	disconfirm	it”(p.19,	my	italics),	the	implication	being	that	choices	of	methodology	are	not	always	meant	to	be	tested.	
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To	trust	a	science	of	well-being	is	in	part	to	trust	that	it	is	based	on	an	appropriate	conception	of	well-being.	But	objectivity	means	(and	has	meant14)	many	things;	so	before	I	state	the	principles	that	realize	it	for	mixed	claims,	I	distinguish	my	focus	from	other	objectivities.		Janack	[2002]	identifies	no	fewer	than	twenty	senses	of	objectivity	in	contemporary	philosophy	of	science	alone.	More	manageably	Douglas	[2004]	draws	a	three-way	distinction:	(1)	objectivity	as	a	way	of	'getting	at	the	objects'	as	they	really	are,	(2)	objectivity	as	a	way	of	minimizing	bias,	and	(3)	objectivity	as	a	characteristic	of	the	social	process	of	science.15	Each	of	the	three	senses	mark	a	legitimate	goal	for	the	science	of	well-being.	Focusing	on	(1]),	we	might	ask	whether	well-being	is	a	plausible	scientific	object	–	is	it	stable	enough	to	persist	over	peoples	and	histories	enabling	meaningful	comparisons	and	theory	building?	Is	it	robust	enough	to	changes	in	our	instruments	and	methods?	Focusing	on	(2),	we	might	worry,	as	we	already	have	in	the	discussion	on	impartiality,	about	dogmatism	and	wishful	thinking.		While	both	of	these	foci	are	eminently	legitimate,	they	do	not	help	with	imposition	and	inattention.	Securing	the	right	normative	assumptions	for	mixed	claims	is	neither	a	metaphysical	task	of	making	sure	well-being	is	out	there,	nor	is	it	a	task	of	eliminating	values.	Rather	I	am	after	the	sort	of	objectivity	that	ensures	that	values	have	undergone	an	appropriate	social	control,	giving	a	community	reasons	to	trust	this	knowledge.	Such	a	control	may	not	warrant	blanket	trust	in	a	research	project	on	the	whole,	but	it	would	at	least	warrant	trust	in	the	project's	value	presuppositions	and	at	least	by	the	community	that	exercized	control	over	these	values.	This	sense	of	objectivity	is	closest	to	Douglas's	(3)	and	to	the	'procedural	objectivity'	that	became	popular	in	the	twentieth	century	(Porter	[1995],	Fine	[1998]).	Procedural	objectivity	focuses	on	the	process	of	inquiry,	not	its	results,	aiming	to	ensure	that	this	process	is	transparent,	legitimate	and	resistant	to	hijacking	by	specific	individuals	or	groups.			Historically,	procedural	objectivity	has	been	thought	to	require	value-freedom	understood	as	impersonality,	i.e.	procedures	should	not	presuppose	the	point	of	view	of	any	particular	person,	group,	or	ideology	(ibid).		But	value-freedom	and	procedural	objectivity	do	not	stand	or	fall	together.	There	could	be	good	procedures	for	dealing	with	values.	This	is	the	conceit	of	philosophers	who	defend	accounts	of	procedural	moral	objectivity	inspired	by	the	pragmatism	of	John	Dewey.	On	this	account	the	objective	values	are	those	that	survive	criticism	in	the	public	sphere	and	that	are	tested	through	‘experiments	in	living’	(Putnam	[2002],	Anderson	[2014],	Brown	[2013],	Roth	[2013]).	This	pragmatist	story	is	often	contrasted	to	constructivist	conceptions	of	political	objectivity	that	justify	the	principles	of,	say,	a	liberal	democratic	state	by	appeal	to	outcomes	of	a	more	or	less	ideal	deliberation	(Rawls	[1996],	Nussbaum	[2001],	Gaus	[2011]	among	many	others).		Scientists	who	put	forward	and	test	mixed	claims	do	not	have	access	to	ideal	deliberation.	This	fact	of	life	favors	the	pragmatist	story	for	our	case.		But	rather																																																									14	See	Daston	[1992]	on	historical	shifts	in	conceptions	of	objectivity.		15	Douglas	[2004]	also	draws	further	distinctions	within	each	of	the	three	modes,	but	they	do	not	all	concern	us.	
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than	entering	the	debate	between	pragmatists	and	ideal	theorists,	I	move	straight	to	those	actionable	principles	that	when	used	by	a	scientific	community	will	deal	with	imposition	and	inattention.	These	principles	are	compelling	whichever	precise	story	about	procedural	objectivity	is	adopted.		
	
8.	Three	Rules	
	
8.1	Unearth	the	value	presuppositions	in	methods	and	measures.		Inattention	is	a	failure	to	acknowledge	the	values	shaping	a	research	agenda.	Philosophers	of	science	of	all	persuasions	have	urged	making	these	presuppositions	explicit	(Weber	[1949],	Nagel	[1961],	Hausman	and	McPherson	[2006],	Douglas	[2011]	and	others].	I	agree	that	this	is	the	first	step.	Depending	on	the	case,	explicitness	is	more	or	less	straightforwardly	implemented.	Sometimes	all	it	takes	is	a	sentence	in	the	Methods	section	of	a	journal	article:	‘In	this	study	we	assume	that	well-being	consists	in	a	favorable	ratio	of	positive	to	negative	emotions’.	At	other	times,	when	scientific	formalisms	hide	the	value	presupposition,	it	takes	a	great	deal	of	work,	often	a	philosopher’s	eye16,	to	uncover	them.			One	obstacle	to	explicitness	is	the	sheer	absence	of	an	underlying	theory	in	some	cases.	For	example,	measures	of	quality	of	life	are	often	indices	constructed	from	several	indicators.	In	the	social	indicators	tradition,	child	well-being	is	measured	by	an	index	of	infant	mortality,	vaccination,	school	attendance	and	a	few	other	statistics	(Land	et	al	[2001]).	No	researcher	pretends	that	these	factors	‘are’	child	well-being.	They	are	only	meant	to	be	indicators	of	it.	What	then	is	child	well-being?	This	question	is	usually	left	unanswered	by	the	scientists	averse	to	philosophizing.17	But	if	explicitness	is	needed	to	combat	inattention,	and	if	inattention	is	an	obstacle	to	procedural	objectivity,	such	a	failure	to	philosophize	about	the	nature	of	well-being	is	a	failure	of	procedural	objectivity.	So	whenever	scientists	measure	or	otherwise	study	the	well-being	of	X,	they	should	be	able	to	say,	at	least	in	outline,	what	the	well-being	of	X	is;	otherwise	they	are	not	attending	to	their	value	presuppositions.	In	the	next	section	I	consider	the	case	when	the	precise	definition	does	not	matter	because	the	empirical	relation	of	interest	holds	on	‘any’	definition.	But	even	then	scientists	should	say	what	accounts	of	well-being	the	different	measures	presuppose.			As	well	as	laying	cards	on	the	table,	explicitness	calls	for	an	acknowledgment	of	alternative	presuppositions,	or	at	least	awareness	that	they	exist	and	that	the	disagreement	about	them	is	in	part	a	substantive	disagreement	about	values	and	not	just	a	difference	about	which	measures	are	more	convenient.	Though	this																																																									16	Hausman	and	McPherson	[2006]	chapter	2	is	a	classic	illustration	of	how	to	unearth	the	moral	assumptions	in	economic	reasoning.	17	On	the	absence	of	a	theory	of	child	well-being	and	what	to	do	about	it	see	Raghavan	and	Alexandrova	[2015].	
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aspect	might	take	some	scientists	out	of	their	comfort	zone,	explicitness	is	realistic	to	achieve.	But	merely	having	values	in	the	open	does	not	guard	against	imposition.	The	next	two	rules	show	what	to	do	when	disagreements	about	values	arise,	for	example	when	relevant	parties	differ	in	their	conception	of	well-being.		 	
8.2	Check	if	value	presuppositions	are	invariant	to	disagreements.		Sometimes	measures	of	well-being	are	‘robust’	to	fundamental	philosophical	disagreements.	At	their	best,	measures	of	child	well-being,	for	example,	attempt	to	capture	conditions	that	if	realized	in	childhood	enable	children	to	grow	up	happier,	healthier,	and	more	positively	connected	to	others.	Thus	these	measures	stand	up	on	all	major	of	theories	of	well-being	that	contemporary	Western	community	entertains	–	experiential,	reflective	and	objective.	At	least	this	is	the	hope.		It	is	this	robustness	–	an	invariance	to	several	different	conceptions	of	well-being	–	that	gives	some	mixed	claims	objectivity	on	the	cheap,	so	to	speak.		If	such	a	robustness	exists,	scientists	can	stop	here.	But	philosophizing	will	not	always	be	avoided	so	easily.	Sometimes	it	matters	a	great	deal	which	precise	measure	of	well-being	is	selected.	Today	some	governments	want	to	measure	and	track	national	well-being	(Stiglitz	et	al	[2009],	Office	of	National	Statistics	[2012]).	There	is	no	shortage	of	academic	opinions	on	the	matter.	Daniel	Kahneman	and	colleagues	advocate	a	hedonic	measure	–	a	nation	is	doing	well	to	the	extent	that	its	populace	has	on	average	a	favorable	balance	of	positive	over	negative	emotions	(Kahneman	et	al	[2004a]).	Development	economists	prefer	measures	based	on	objective	quality	of	life	(Nussbaum	and	Sen	[1993],	Dasgupta	[2001]).	Yet	others	work	with	a	life	satisfaction	notion	of	well-being,	which	purports	to	best	respect	the	judgment	of	the	individual	(Diener	et	al	[2008]).	But	these	different	measures	are	not	robust	in	the	sense	above.		A	2010	article	by	Kahneman	and	Deaton	has	a	self-explanatory	title	‘High	income	improves	evaluation	of	life	but	not	emotional	well-being’.	Depending	on	whether	scientists	use	life	satisfaction	measures	(which	capture	evaluation)	or	happiness	measures	(which	capture	emotional	well-being),	they	will	reach	radically	different	verdicts	on	whether	economic	growth	promotes	well-being.	Which	measure	is	correct	is	a	choice	that	in	a	democratic	society	should	be	made	in	a	way	that	the	next	principle	proposes.			
8.3	Consult	the	relevant	parties.		When	the	choice	of	a	measure	of	well-being	is	a	choice	between	conflicting	sets	of	values,	the	only	way	to	practice	trustworthy	science	is	to	make	this	choice	in	a	deliberative	public	setting	in	which	the	relevant	parties	are	included.	A	measure	of	well-being	that	survives	public	scrutiny	has	procedural	objectivity.	Consider	an	example.		
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Between	2010	and	2012	the	UK	Office	for	National	Statistics	(ONS)	conducted	a	country-wide	inquiry	called	“What	matters	to	you?”	(ONS	[2012]).	Potential	measures	of	well-being	were	released	publically	with	the	following	questions:	1. Do	you	think	the	proposed	domains	present	a	complete	picture	of	well-being?	If	not,	what	would	you	do	differently?	2. Do	you	think	the	scope	of	each	of	the	proposed	domains	is	correct?	If	not,	please	give	details.						
The	outcome	of	this	exercise	is	a	measure	of	UK’s	well-being	that	contains	both	subjective	indicators	–	happiness,	life	satisfaction,	sense	of	meaning	–	and	also	objective	indicators,	such	as	life	expectancy	and	educational	achievements.	The	ONS	settled	the	seemingly	intractable	debates	between	the	experts	by	including	as	many	items	into	its	final	measure	as	practically	possible,	and	also	by	having	the	public	vet	this	measure.	No	doubt	the	ONS	measure	has	problems,	but	the	honest	effort	to	canvass	the	diverse	views	shows	that	the	value	presuppositions	on	this	measure	have	arguably	passed	the	sort	of	test	I	have	in	mind.		This	example	combines	features	of	two	relatively	recent	experiments	in	political	science	and	science	studies	respectively:	deliberative	polling	and	systematic	participation	of	the	public	in	science.	Deliberative	polling	(Fishkin	[2009])	occurs	when	a	representative	sample	of	the	public	comes	together	for	a	small	group	session	with	a	moderator	to	discuss	a	question	of	public	policy	(for	example,	should	a	minimum	wage	be	required?).	The	participants	get	input	from	the	scholars	who	are	experts	on	the	topic	via	preliminary	briefings.	Moderators	are	trained	to	foster	a	respectful	and	inclusive	debate.	At	the	end	the	attitudes	of	the	participants	are	measured	and	compared	against	their	earlier	attitudes.		While	political	scientists	find	ways	of	building	consensus	about	politics,	science	studies	scholars	explore	ways	for	people	affected	by	a	piece	of	science	or	medicine	to	have	a	systematic	and	non-trivial	say	in	its	methods,	assumptions	or	applications,	while	at	the	same	time	respecting	existing	scientific	expertise.18		Putting	these	two	traditions	together	I	propose	‘deliberative	polls	of	normative	presuppositions	of	mixed	claims’.	Groups	of	deliberators	could	be	presented	with	various	options	for	conceptualizing	well-being	(or	freedom,	health,	etc.,)	and	with	the	relative	advantages	of	each	option	normatively	and	practically.	The	deliberators	will	attempt	to	reach	agreement	according	to	whatever	consensus-building	and	voting	rules	they	decide	to	put	in	place.	Even	if	not	everybody	favors	the	values	that	survive	such	an	exercise,	the	resulting	consensus	has	some	legitimacy	and	deserves	trust	at	least	from	those	whose	views	are	admissible	in	a	democracy	and	have	been	heard.			Such	deliberations	should	include	samples	of	all	concerned	parties.	The	ONS	consultation	happened	by	soliciting	responses	to	an	online	questionnaire	widely	advertised	through	the	ONS	website,	letters	and	public	events.	Generalizing	from	this	example,	I	suggest	that	for	mixed	claims	about	well-being	the	deliberative																																																									18	Chilvers	[2008]	and	Douglas	[2005]	provide	an	overview	of	the	history	and	the	recent	efforts.	
3. Is	the	balance	between	objective	and	subjective	measures	about	right?	Please	give	details.							
	 19	
polling	should	include	(a)	the	scholars	of	different	approaches	to	well-being	(plausibly	philosophers	or	anthropologists),	(b)	the	researchers	doing	the	measurement	and	data	collection,	(c)	the	policy	users	of	this	knowledge,	and	(d)	a	representative	sample	of	the	subjects	who	are	likely	to	be	affected	when	this	knowledge	is	put	into	practice	through	policy,	therapies	and	other	interventions.			The	inclusion	of	experts	is	important	because	as	I	argued	in	4.1,	scientists	have	normative	knowledge	in	virtue	of	their	empirical	knowledge.	Respecting	this	knowledge	means	that	decisions	about	measures	of	well-being	should	not	be	outsourced	to	the	non-scientists.	But	including	the	non-scientists	is	no	less	important.	When	scientists	measure	and	monitor	well-being	this	information	can	be	used	for	oppression	and	domination.	Science	after	all	has	the	power	and	indeed	a	well-documented	tendency	to	devalue	non-expert	sources	of	knowledge.19	Having	people	weigh	in	on	how	their	own	well-being	is	measured	is	a	prudent	reaction	to	these	dangers,	a	reaction	that	need	not	assume	that	well-being	is	whatever	people	say	it	is.20			Can	such	exercises	respect	the	expertise	of	scientists	on	well-being	while	at	the	same	time	avoiding	imposing	values	on	non-scientists?	This	depends	on	the	implementation:	what	proportion	of	scientists	to	non-scientists	is	in	the	group,	how	the	final	consensus	is	determined,	what	checks	there	are	on	power	imbalances.	These	are	hard	but	not	intractable	questions.	The	deliberative	exercises	I	sketch	here	are	expensive,	difficult	to	realize	and	uncertain	in	their	fruitfulness.	So	it	is	an	open	question	whether	mine	is	a	rational	bet	all	things	considered.	But	it	seems	wrong	not	to	try.			
9.	Conclusion		I	proposed	three	rules:	to	make	explicit	the	value	presuppositions	of	mixed	claims,	to	check	whether	the	empirical	claim	is	robust	to	disagreements	about	values,	and	finally,	if	it	isn’t	robust,	to	expose	these	values	to	an	inclusive	deliberation.			Together	these	three	principles	ensure	that	the	science	of	well-being	neither	imposes	values,	nor	sneaks	them	past	the	people	whose	well-being	is	in	question.		Following	these	rules,	I	submit,	secures	procedural	objectivity	for	the	value	presuppositions	of	this	science.	For	other	mixed	claims,	such	as	about	freedom	or	health,	these	principles	may	need	to	be	amended,	but	the	spirit	–	objectivity	as	open	vetting	–	should	remain	the	same.		When	the	very	definition	and	measurement	of	phenomena	depends	on	moral	categories,	as	they	do	in	mixed	sciences,	we	face	a	choice.	We	could	reserve	the	notion	of	objectivity	only	for	decisions	and	practices	that	avoid	any	such	values.																																																									19	Wynne	[1989]	is	a	classic	study	of	this	phenomenon.	20	See	Haybron	and	Tiberius	[2015]	for	an	argument	that	in	a	policy	context	well-being	measures	should	be	sensitive	to	the	priorities	of	the	citizens	whose	well-being	is	in	question.	
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This	is	a	view	that	preserves	the	neutrality	of	science	at	the	expense	of	expelling	mixed	claims.	I	have	argued	against	this.	Mixed	claims	are	already	part	and	parcel	of	science.	Pretending	that	they	can	be	reformulated	into	value-free	claims	devalues	perfectly	good	knowledge	and	stakes	the	authority	of	science	on	its	separation	from	the	community	that	enables	it.	The	alternative	I	favor	is	to	broaden	our	notion	of	objectivity	to	encompass	also	value-based	decisions,	such	as	which	measures	of	well-being	to	adopt	and	when.				
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